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Prisoners’ rights and the separation of powers: comparing approaches in Ireland, Scotland
and England and Wales
Introduction
The decision of Hogan J in Kinsella v. Governor of Mountjoy Prison [2011] IEHC 235
(hereinafter Kinsella) is an important development in the protection of prisoners’
constitutional rights in Ireland. The decision, which found that a prisoner’s right to have his
person protected had been breached by his detention in a padded cell with a cardboard box
for use as a toilet in conditions amounting to a form of sensory deprivation, may represent a
new direction for prison law jurisprudence. The judgment is also of significance for its
analysis of the circumstances in which conditions of detention can give rise to an order for
release under Article 40.4 of the Irish Constitution, which allows for the immediate release
of a person found to be detained otherwise in accordance with law.
Though of particular interest in the Irish context, the judgment in Kinsella is of relevance
beyond Ireland, in the areas of prison litigation as well as for its analysis of the delicate
interplay between the Executive and the courts in the area of prison administration.
This note examines the implications of the decision in Kinsella and compares the response
of the courts of Scotland and England and Wales to the claims of prisoners that their rights
have been breached. The note examines the innovative way judges have responded to the
breach of constitutional rights when there are strong countervailing interests of the
Executive, and argues that the difficult position in which courts are placed in such cases has
been precipitated by a failure at the policy-making level.
The facts in Kinsella
The applicant was at the time of his application under Article 40.4.2, a prisoner in Mountjoy
Prison. The application was made on the grounds that his constitutional rights had been
infringed due to the prison conditions he was required to endure such that his detention

had become unlawful. The right to liberty in Ireland is constitutionally guaranteed and the
remedy of habeas corpus is also enshrined within the Constitution itself. 1
The applicant was on protection, meaning that his life would be in danger if he were to be
allowed to mix freely with the majority of other prisoners. He had been detained in an
observation cell in the basement of the prison. The cell was entirely padded and contained
nothing other than a mattress, and was approximately three metres by three metres, with a
small window providing some natural light. The window had a shutter but there was a
dispute in evidence as to whether the shutter was working at the time of detention. The
applicant further maintained that he was provided with no reading material and had no
access to a radio or television. Regarding toilet arrangements, Hogan J stated: “the
sanitation facilities – if this is really the correct term in the circumstances – simply consist of
a cardboard box”.2
All parties agreed that the applicant had spent “virtually all” of the eleven days prior to the
application confined to this padded cell. Mr. Kinsella had the opportunity to make one
telephone call of six minutes duration every day. The Deputy Governor of the prison agreed
in evidence that the applicant was also entitled to one hour’s recreational exercise each day
as well as an opportunity to shower. The applicant gave evidence that these facilities had
not been afforded to him and the Deputy Governor could not controvert this as he had been
away on official business. Hogan J held that even if the applicant were to have received this
period of recreation, “this would have only marginally ameliorated these conditions”. 3
The cell in which the applicant was detained was designed to act as temporary
accommodation for disturbed prisoners requiring protection from self harm or who pose an
immediate threat to other prisoners. Mr Kinsella did not fall into either of those categories.
Hogan J held that it was “clear that the prison authorities are wholly motivated by a desire
to protect Mr Kinsella from harm and that they bear him no ill-will”. 4 In Hogan J’s words,
“the real problem is the shortage of single cells within the prison system given that,
1
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unfortunately, Mr Kinsella is not the only prisoner who needs to be protected in this
fashion”. 5 Hogan J accepted the evidence of the Deputy Governor that the authorities had
regularly and consistently sought alternative accommodation for the applicant.
The compliance of the conditions of detention with the Constitution
Hogan J considered the application of Article 40.3.2 of Bunreacht na hÉireann, the
Constitution of Ireland, which requires the State by its laws to “protect as best it may from
unjust attack and, in the case of injustice done, to vindicate the life, person, good name and
property rights of every citizen”. Hogan J accepted that the right to life may be engaged by
the conditions, but it was the State’s duty to protect and vindicate the person of the
applicant which was principally engaged in the application, noting “it is undeniable that
detention in a padded cell of this kind involves a form of sensory deprivation. 6 Hogan J
noted he was using the term “a form of sensory deprivation” advisedly as the conditions
were still very far removed from the five techniques condemned by the European Court of
Human Rights in Ireland v. United Kingdom. 7
Hogan J considered that the protection afforded by Article 40.3.2 was not simply the
integrity of the human body, “but also the integrity of the human mind and personality” 8
and that extended detention in such circumstances gave rise to the risk of psychiatric
disturbance.
The nature of the conditions
Hogan J considered that even making all due allowances for the exigencies of prison life and
the difficulties faced by the prison authorities in making complex arrangements for a wide
variety of prisoners with different needs who often require protection, such detention
“compromises the essence and substance of this constitutional guarantee, irrespective of
the crimes he has committed or the offences with which he is charged”. 9
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Hogan J held that it was not the case that such a cell could never be used, and different
considerations might arise in the case of disturbed prisoners or where there was a need for
temporary accommodation on an emergency basis, “but detention in such conditions for
well over a week fails to meet the minimum standards of confinement pre-supposed” by
Article 40.3.2. Accordingly, Hogan J found that the conditions under which the applicant was
detained constituted a violation of his constitutional right to the protection of the person.
Breach of rights and release
The next question for the court was whether the violation was such as to entitle him to
immediate and unconditional release. Hogan J noted that the court may enjoy “some
residual jurisdiction” for the purposes of making its orders effective, short of full release. In
this regard, Hogan J referred to the judgment of O’Higgins CJ in The State (McDonagh) v.
Frawley 10 which held that an application for habeas corpus is not a suitable means for the
judicial investigation of complaints regarding conditions of detention which fall short of
rendering that detention ‘not in accordance with law’. Such conditions should be
investigated under other forms of proceedings, particularly judicial review.
Hogan J also considered Brennan v. Governor of Mountjoy Prison 11 in which Budd J held
that the intentional violation of a prisoner’s right might be a ground for ordering the release
of a convicted prisoner under Article 40.4.2. Furthermore, Hogan J relied on the guidance
given by Clarke J in H v. Russell, 12 which concerned detention under the Mental Health Act
2001. Clarke J held there that “a complete failure to provide appropriate conditions or
appropriate treatment” was the only situation in which a lawful detention could be
rendered unlawful, relying on The State (Richardson) v. Governor of Mountjoy Prison. 13
Regarding the application of these principles to the case of Mr Kinsella, Hogan J held: “in the
present case I cannot presently say that the applicant’s continued detention has been
rendered entirely unlawful by the breach of his constitutional rights or that the authorities
have completely failed in their duties and obligations towards him”.14 Hogan J declared that
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he had reached this conclusion in light of what the learned judge considered to be the “real
and genuine concern” for the applicant’s safety on the part of the prison authorities as well
as “the substantial difficulties which they have hitherto encountered in finding suitable
accommodation for him”. 15
Hogan J held that decisions such as The State (Richardson) v. Governor of Mountjoy Prison 16
showed that “absent something akin to an intentional violation or manifest negligence on
the part of the authorities (which is not the case here), it would be only proper to give them
a fair opportunity to remedy the situation in the light of this decision”. 17 Hogan J considered
that this salutation was not only in accordance with the decisions on the nature of the
remedy under Article 40.4.4, but was also “perhaps the one which is most apt having regard
to the principles of the separation of powers”.
Hogan J’s analysis in this regard is most interesting, not only for those concerned with
prisoners’ rights and principles of administrative law, but also for scholars of judicial
decision making. In Hogan J’s view, “the present case may yet prove to be an example of a
constructive engagement of this kind between the executive and judicial branches which
achieves a just solution in line with appropriate separation of powers concerns without the
immediate necessity for a coercive or even a declaratory court order”.18 However, Hogan J
also issued a warning to the authorities that such a holding was not to give rise to delay,
noting that if the guarantee provided in Article 40.3.2 is to be rendered meaningful for the
applicant “then this further opportunity can really only be measured in terms of days” and
“with each passing day, the present case would inch ever closer to the point whereby this
Court could stay its hand no longer” and order release. 19
In a postscript to the judgment it was revealed that after the judgment had been delivered
the prison authorities had informed the court that it was intended to transfer the applicant
to an available space in Cloverhill prison the following morning and that this had been
carried out that day.
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The decision in Kinsella and prisoners’ rights
The judgment of Hogan J is a significant one in a number of respects. First, the declaration
that the constitutional rights of a prisoner have been breached is most consequential. It is
rare to find an applicant who has successfully argued that prison conditions breach the Irish
Constitution.20 The Irish courts have held that a prisoner does have a right to bodily integrity
and a right not to have his or health exposed to risk or danger. 21 However, it has also been
held that both such rights must be subject to limitations of practicality, the common good or
the protection of the prisoner him or herself. 22
Moreover, while the courts have held that prisoners have a right not to be exposed to
inhuman or degrading treatment, they has also held that in order to establish a violation of
that right it would be necessary to establish an ‘evil purpose’ on the part of the prison
authorities or that the restrictions and privations on detention were punitive or malicious. 23
Not only must there be ‘evil’ consequences of detention, but here must be an evil purpose,
“most commonly inspired by revenge, retaliation, the creation of fear or improper
interrogation”.24
In the most recent and most extensive discussion of prisoners’ rights by an Irish court in the
context of a judicial review application, Mulligan v. Governor of Portlaoise Prison, 25 the High
Court declined to hold that the conditions in which the applicant was imprisoned breached
the Constitution. There, the applicant contended that the absence of in-cell sanitation,
unhygienic conditions and the need to ‘slop out’ breached his rights under the Constitution
or the European Convention on Human Rights, seeking declarations and damages.
MacMenamin J considered that the applicant’s case was reliant on asserting constitutional
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rights in tort form and as a corollary the defendant was entitled to rely on defences in the
law of torts such as causation, consent and foreseeability.
As has been common in cases involving assertion of a breach of the constitutional rights of
prisoners, MacMenamin J held that there was no evidence that the purpose or intention of
the restrictions on the regime were punitive, malicious or evil in purpose, still less was there
evidence that the authorities were taking advantage of the detention to violate the
applicant’s constitutional rights or to subject him to inhuman or degrading treatment. The
learned judge accepted that the facilities fell significantly below the standards to be
expected as regards ventilation, hygiene and slopping out, but the regime as a whole,
involving a single cell, out of cell time and good access to workshops and other facilities
outweighed the negative aspects of the conditions. 26 Moreover, though the conditions were
demeaning they were not such as to endanger life or health seriously and the applicant was
not required to ‘double up’, meaning there was no breach of privacy. Regarding the right to
bodily integrity, the court found that the applicant had not taken steps to remedy the
physical injury he alleged had occurred as a result of slopping as he had not given adequate
notice of this to the authorities nor request individual arrangements to accommodate him.
MacMenamin J also noted that the allocation of resources in order to remedy the conditions
through replacing the facility was a matter for the Executive and the courts should be slow
to become involved. 27
The court in Mulligan further examined the application of Articles 3 and 8 of the European
Convention on Human Rights. The Convention has been incorporated into Irish law by the
European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003, which allows for declarations of
incompatibility with the Convention and the possibility of ex gratia payments by the
Government.
In analysing this aspect of the claim, the court in Mulligan laid emphasis on the fact that Mr
Mulligan did not have to share a cell, did not make significant complaints about the
sanitation arrangements, had an adequate supply of soap, disinfectant and bleach and was
able to purchase air fresheners. Taken both individually and cumulatively, there was no
26
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breach of the applicant’s rights under the Convention by virtue of the conditions of his
detention.
In Mulligan MacMenamin J appears to leave open the possibility that the outcome of a case
taken under the European Convention on Human Rights may be different where a prisoner
is required to slop out in overcrowded conditions with minimal out of cell time and with
poor arrangements for hygiene. Nonetheless, the dicta in Mulligan that a prisoner arguing
that his or her constitutional rights have been breached is still required to show evidence of
‘evil intention’ on the part of the prison authorities means that any such claim under the
Constitution would have difficulty in succeeding. In this regard Kinsella is particularly
significant.
In Kinsella, Hogan J had no hesitation in finding that the authorities were acting from the
best of motives towards the applicant and as such no malicious or punitive intent could be
found in the manner of his detention. However, the court also found that Mr Kinsella’s
constitutional rights had been breached. This seems to be, at least in effect, at some
variance with earlier jurisprudence which held that in order to establish a breach of
constitutional rights, quite apart from justifying release, such malicious intention would
have to be established.
It is submitted that examining the attitude of the authorities when making the decision
whether to release the prisoner or not is a more sensible way of taking note of the intention
of the prison authorities than in earlier caselaw, which set too high a hurdle for prisoners to
succeed in such claims. Prison authorities tend to be dealing with multiple competing
priorities and engaged in difficult questions of the distribution of resources and may be
acting with the best of motives. However, the results of their action or inaction, however
well intentioned, can certainly give rise to breaches of constitutional rights which must be
addressed and remedied.
The amount of delay which will be tolerated by the court gives considerable flexibility both
to the courts and the prison service in balancing the difficult questions of the distribution of
resources, the administration of the prison system, the separation of powers and the need
to vindicate the rights of prisoners. There is no doubt, however, that this does not give a

great deal of specific guidance either to prison administration or to prisoners and their
lawyers considering a habeas corpus application. Moreover, where breaches of
constitutional rights occur, their remedy must be the priority over and above the
convenience of the prison authorities or the extension of leniency to them on the basis that
they are well intentioned. An overly deferential approach to the authorities in this regard is
to be avoided.
Flexible remedies in Irish law
It is undoubtedly unusual for a court to find a breach of a detained person’s constitutional
rights, but to hold further that the individual is not in unlawful custody. There have,
however, been some previous examples in Ireland of courts finding a breach of
constitutional rights but making no order. In District Justice McMenanim v. Ireland 28
Hamilton CJ stated that such a position was possible because of the respect which the
separate organs of government have traditionally shown each other. 29
In Doherty v. Government of Ireland 30 the applicant sought a declaration that there had
been unreasonable delay in moving the writ for a by-election. Other relief, including an
order directing the Government not to oppose any motion to move the by-election, was
also sought. The High Court agreed that there had been an unreasonable delay and decided
to make a declaration to this effect, but did not impose any other relief.31 Kearns J stated,
however, that he hoped “any clarification provided by this judgment would have that
effect” [of prompting the moving of the writ or declining to oppose it]. As Hogan J warned in
Kinsella, Kearns J cautioned that if there was continual refusal over an unreasonable period
of time to move the writ, the court might, in another case, “feel constrained to take a more
serious view”.32
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There is also a precedent for finding that a person was not detained in lawful custody but
without an order for release. In AM v. Kennedy, 33 the applicant contended that he was
unlawfully detained in the Central Mental Hospital, Dublin, on the basis that an order for the
renewal of his detention had expired prior to the issue of a further renewal. This was
accepted by the High Court. All available medical opinion was of the view that the further
detention of the applicant was needed for his own safety and that of others. Peart J
refrained from making any order for release until the parties have had an opportunity to
decide how, in the best interests of the applicant, his further detention until his sufficient
recovery could be achieved in accordance with law.
Courts are understandably wary of stepping too far over the separation of powers, or of the
release of a mentally ill person or a prisoner. Hogan J’s reasoning in Kinsella represents an
attempt to fashion a pragmatic and reasonable solution to the competing interests involved.
Prisoners’ rights: Comparing Ireland, Scotland and England and Wales
There is a clear distinction between the law in Ireland and that of England and Wales
regarding the availability of habeas corpus in cases of poor conditions. It is clear since the
decision of Hague v. Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison 34 that detention will not be
rendered unlawful because of prison conditions. The House of Lords held: “an alteration of
his [a prisoner’s] conditions deprives him of no liberty because he has none already”.35 The
position of the Irish courts regarding the availability of habeas corpus also appears not to be
required under the European Convention on Human Rights. In Ashingdale v. UK 36 it was held
that Article 5, the right to liberty, does not apply to the conditions or type of detention but
deals only with the initial decision to detain. Claims regarding prison conditions must
therefore be brought under Article 3.
33
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While the Irish courts may be somewhat unusual in allowing habeas corpus in cases of
prison conditions, the Scottish courts have proven to be less reluctant to find breaches of
the European Convention on Human Rights regarding prisoners, to engage in analysis of its
caselaw and indeed to award damages than those in Ireland.
The case of Napier v. Scottish Ministers 37 involved prison conditions in which prisoners were
confined two to a cell for at least 20 hours on average per day. The cells were found by the
court to be “cramped, stuffy and gloomy” 38 Prisoners had no access to a toilet during the
night and for extended periods at the weekend and were required to slop out. There was no
structured activity other than walking in the yard for one hour and recreation for ninety
minutes per week. Examining the effect of the conditions on the prisoner, the court held
that they induced feelings of worthlessness and disgust, as well as avoidance of using the
chamber pot. The petitioner had eczema, which was considered to be of “crucial
importance” to the determination. The court held that the petitioner’s serious outbreak of
eczema resurged and persisted because of the conditions of detention; the eczema was of
itself a source of acute embarrassment and humiliation and he believed that the infection of
the eczema was caused by the conditions of detention, particularly slopping out, which
belief the court described as reasonable and held to be felt acutely. The petitioner had,
therefore, been exposed to conditions which, taken together, meant that he had been
subjected to degrading treatment in infringement of Article 3. 39
In 2011, three former prisoners at HMP Peterhead took judicial review proceedings
complaining, inter alia, that the conditions of their incarceration subjected them to inhuman
or degrading treatment and were also an unjustified interference with the right to respect
for private life. 40
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No integral sanitation exists at Peterhead and each cell was equipped with a chemical toilet
known as a ‘porta potti’. The petitioners claimed that the use of these toilets, the lack of
hand washing facilities within the cells, the lack of ventilation and the practice of ‘bombing’,
whereby prisoners defecated into newspapers or other items or urinated into jars and
threw them out of the window, breached Article 3.
The court accepted that it is not necessary to establish damage to physical or mental health
for a breach of Article 3 to be established, but treatment of “some severity” must
nonetheless be established. 41 Examining the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
Rights, the court held that single cell slopping out per se had not been found to amount to a
breach of Article 3 but that the European Court had repeatedly found a violation of Article 3
in situations where a prisoner has been required to relieve himself into a bucket in the
presence of others, and having to be present when others did the same. 42 The court in
Greens specifically rejected the contention that Article 3 requires the use of a screened and
flushing toilet. The court considered that the finding in Napier was based on the triple vices
of overcrowding, slopping out and an impoverished regime. By contrast, the court held the
petitioners in Greens based their cases very strongly on the slopping out process itself.
The court rejected evidence from the petitioners regarding the nature of the slopping out
process and the extent of the smell and placed a great deal of emphasis on the fact that the
prisoners involved did not have to share a cell, that work was available and there were
many opportunities for out-of-cell time. The fact that the prison was not overcrowded was
also important. The court considered the privacy of the single cell and the accepted practice
of blocking the spy hole when using the chemical toilet (despite being a breach of the
regulations) to be very important factors and also rejected the prisoners’ evidence that they
felt stressed and humiliated. The court noted that there were differences between the use
of buckets and chamber pots and the use of chemical toilets. Taken together, the court did
not consider that the petitioners’ human dignity was diminished by the conditions.
41
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The court did, however, find a breach of Article 8. In its view, the scope of ‘private life’ can
include the activities of discharging bodily waste and maintaining a standard of cleanliness.
The court was keen to point out that it was not laying down a general principle that
requiring a person to defecate into a bucket which must be slopped out was a breach of
Article 8. Assessing the facts before the court, it held that there was no human right to a
screened and flushing lavatory and the use of a chemical toilet in a single cell where a
sanitation work party empties such toilets is not a breach of Article 8. However, when
prisoners were required to slop out the chemical toilets themselves and queue to do so,
there had an interference with their private lives. To be forced to queue in a line of others
with a receptacle of one’s own waste and to have to empty it in the presence of others
constituted an infringement of Article 8. The Court therefore awarded damages in the sum
of £500.
The courts in England and Wales have taken a somewhat less expansive approach to
prisoners’ rights. One case bears some resemblance to Kinsella. In R (on the application of
BP) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department 43 a 17 year old male was detained in a
young offenders institution. He had a history of self-harm and attempted suicide. The
prisoner contended that on the first occasion of his segregation there was no heating
provided and he was not given anything to do. He said he felt odd and paranoid as a result.
It was held that the prison authorities had breached the Prison Rules, but, considering the
facilities in the cell, the length of time he was there and the number of visits he had, there
had been no breach of Article 3. The Court also held that there was no evidence that his
physical and psychological integrity had been violated in breach of Article 8.
Regarding sanitation, in Broom v. Secretary of State for the Home Department 44 a prisoner
was transferred between cells every three months and was not provided with an in-cell
privacy screen, which was exacerbated by the dirty nature of some of the toilets and the
presence of female prison officers. The court rejected the claim that there had been a
breach of Article 8, holding that imprisonment was of itself humiliating and his conditions
were no worse than ordinary prison regimes.45
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The separation of powers and the need for policy change
The decision in Kinsella and those of the Scottish courts indicate that when conditions in
prisons are very poor, the judiciary will put aside its usual qualms about stepping into the
realm of administering prisons to afford claimants relief. However, as the cases analysed
above all indicate, the remedies which are given are often limited and give wide latitude to
prison authorities.
The difficult positions in which both the prison authorities and the judiciary are placed when
dealing with decisions about accommodating prisoners who need protection when
inadequate accommodation is available arise, however, from failures of policy and politics.
In such cases in Ireland, the courts are placed in the unenviable position of choosing
between the release of a prisoner lawfully sentenced by a court and allowing conditions
which breach the Constitution to continue. These delicate balancing acts are rendered
necessary by a lack of adequate attention or action at a policy level to such matters which is
where such decisions should be made and indeed such cases averted in all jurisdictions. The
constructive engagement between the prison authorities and the judiciary envisaged by
Hogan J has been necessitated, and indeed is likely to be repeated in Ireland and elsewhere,
as the result of the action and inaction of governments in the treatment of prisoners.

